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ABSTRACT
Leaked passwords from data breaches can pose a serious
threat to users if the password is reused elsewhere. With
more online services getting breached today, there is still a
lack of large-scale quantitative understanding of the risks of
password reuse across services. In this paper, we analyze
a large collection of 28.8 million users and their 61.5 mil-
lion passwords across 107 services. We find that 38% of the
users have reused exactly the same password across differ-
ent sites, while 20% have modified an existing password to
create new ones. In addition, we find that the password mod-
ification patterns are highly consistent across different user
demographics, indicating a high predictability. To quantify
the risk, we build a new training-based guessing algorithm,
and show that more than 16 million password pairs can be
cracked within just 10 attempts (30% of the modified pass-
words and all the reused passwords).
1. INTRODUCTION
The widespread of data breaches (e.g., Yahoo, Myspace,
Office of Personnel Management, Ashley Madison) are pos-
ing significant threats to users and organizations. In 2016
alone, there were more than 2000 confirmed breaches caus-
ing a leakage of billions of user records [11]. Many of the
leaked datasets contain sensitive information such as user
passwords, which are often made publicly available on the
Internet by attackers [24, 25, 28, 29, 37].
A leaked password incurs serious risks if the user reuses
the password across different services. Reusing the same
or even slightly modified passwords allows attackers to fur-
ther compromise the user’s accounts in other “un-breached”
services [23, 26]. Even worse, if the target user happens to
be the administrator of another service, password reuse may
lead to new massive data breaches (e.g., Dropbox [7]).
With more passwords leaked everyday [1, 4], there is still
a lack of large-scale quantitative understanding on password
usage across online services. Existing work studies pass-
word reuse and transformation either through a user sur-
vey [8, 15] or small-scale data analytics (6–7K users) [8,
38]. The limited scope of the data (sample size, service
type, user demographics) makes it challenging to compre-
hensively quantify the risks to see the bigger picture.
In this paper, we conduct a large-scale measurement on
28,836,775 users on their password reuse and modification
patterns across 107 online services.1 By analyzing publicly
available password datasets, we seek to empirically measure
the common ways in which users reuse/modify passwords.
In addition, to quantify the security risks introduced by pass-
word reuse and modification, we develop a training-based
algorithm to guess a target user’s password based on her
leaked one. Our study reveals several key findings.
How often do users reuse or modify existing passwords?
Among the 28.8 million users, we find that 38% of users
have once reused the same password in two different ser-
vices and 21% of the users once modified an existing pass-
word to sign up a new service. Particularly, passwords of
email services (e.g., Gmail) have a noticeably high reuse rate
(60.4%). Given the sensitivity of email accounts, reusing the
password of email accounts incurs serious risks.
What are the common ways of modifying passwords?
We empirically measure 8 high-level categories of password
transformation rules. We find that users prefer using simple
rules to modify passwords. More importantly, the password
transformation patterns are highly consistent across users of
different professions (military, government, education) and
countries. The low variance of the transformation patterns is
likely to make the modified passwords predictable.
How likely can attackers guess a modified password?
Our training-based algorithm can guess 30% of the modified
passwords within 10 attempts (46.5% within 100 attempts).
Together with the identical passwords (reused), more than 16
million password pairs can be cracked within 10 guesses. In
addition, the algorithm achieves a similar performance even
if it is trained with only 0.1% of the data. This confirms
the low-variance of password modification patterns, indicat-
ing that attackers can learn the basic patterns with minimal
training to crack massive passwords in an online fashion.
This work is the first large-scale measurement on the pass-
word reuse and modification patterns across online services.
Our result sheds light on the emerging security threats intro-
duced by massive data breaches, and calls for more effective
tools to secure users’ online accounts and digital assets.
1Our study has received IRB approval (Protocol #17-393).
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Category #Plain PWs Top 3 Largest Datasets
(#Datasets)
Social 286M (7) Myspace, VK, LinkedIn
Adult 75.2M (9) Zoosk, Mate1, YouPorn
Game 40.8M (13) Neopets, 7k7k, Lbsg
Entertain 30.7M (4) Lastfm, Swingbrasileiro, LATimes
Internet 16.4M (18) 000webhost, Comcast, Yahoo
Email 9.6M (3) Gmail, Mail.ru, Yandex
Forum 1.1M (25) CrackingForum, Abusewith.us, Gawker
Shopping 340K (12) RedBox, 1394store, Myaribags
Others 210K (7) Data1, Data2, Data3
Business 10K (9) Movatiathletic, Hrsupporten, 99Fame
Total 460M (107) Myspace, VK, LinkedIn
Table 1: Categories and statistics of collected datasets.
2. RELATED WORK
Password Reuse & Transformation. Password guessing
attacks become a major concern as data breaches are increas-
ingly frequent. The attack is immediately effective if the user
reuses the same password for different services [5,10]. Even
if non-identical passwords are used, users may follow sim-
ple transformation patterns to modify their passwords, which
makes their passwords predicable [8, 38]. Existing work in-
vestigated this problem based on user surveys or small-scale
data analytics (6–7K users) [8, 15, 35, 38]. In this work, we
perform the first a large-scale measurement to understand
cross-site password usage and quantify the risk of leaked
passwords (28.8 million users, 107 websites).
Online & Offline Password Guessing. Online password
guessing requires attackers to guess the password within a
limited number of attempts. Trawling based approach sim-
ply guesses the most popular passwords chosen by users [20].
More targeted guessing exploits the fact that users may reuse
the same/similar passwords across services [8,38] or include
PII information (name, birthday) in their passwords [17,34].
A larger body of work focuses on offline guessing [12–
14, 21, 22, 33, 36], where the number of attempts is unlim-
ited. A common scenario is that given a hashed password
dataset, offline guessing seeks to recover the plaintext pass-
words. A number of approaches have been proposed, in-
cluding Markov Models [18, 22], Mangled Wordlist meth-
ods [31], Probabilistic Context-Free Grammars (PCFGs) [14,
22, 33, 36], and Neural Networks [21]. Offline guessing has
also been used to measure password strength [9, 13, 30].
3. DATASET
To analyze password usage across services, we gathered a
large collection of publicly available password datasets. In
January 2017, we searched through online forums and public
data archives for candidate datasets using two criteria. First,
the dataset should contain email addresses to link a user’s
passwords across services. Second, we exclude datasets with
only salted hashes since it is difficult to massively recover
their passwords.
We collected 107 datasets leaked between 2008–2016, which
contain 497,789,976 passwords and 428,199,842 unique users
(email addresses). 14 datasets contain hashed passwords,
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Figure 1: # of Passwords in each dataset.
and we spent a week to recover the plaintext using offline
guessing tools [2, 13, 31]. In total, we obtained 460,874,306
plaintext passwords (93% of all passwords). The rest 7% are
difficult to recover, and we will use them to test our guess-
ing algorithm later. Figure 1 shows the number of passwords
in each dataset. In Table 1, we classify the datasets into 10
categories. The “others” category contains 7 datasets with
generic file names (difficult to label). We have made sure
that the 7 datasets did not overlap with any existing ones.
Primary Dataset (28.8 Million Users). To study cross-
site password usage, we need users who appear on at least
two websites. To this end, we construct a primary dataset of
28,836,775 users who have at least two plaintext passwords
(61,552,446 passwords in total). Our analysis in the paper
will focus on this primary dataset. Note that users outside of
the primary dataset are not necessarily risk-free: they might
still have accounts in services that we didn’t cover.
Ethic Guidelines. Our work involves analyzing leaked
datasets that contain sensitive information. We have worked
closely with our local IRB and obtained the approval for our
research. Our study is motivated by the following consider-
ations. First, we only analyze datasets that are already pub-
licly available. Analyzing such data does not add additional
risks other than what already exist. Second, these datasets
are also publicly available to potential attackers. Failure to
include the data for research may give attackers an advan-
tage over researchers that work on defensive techniques. In
the past decades, leaked password datasets have been exten-
sively used in academic research [8, 9, 13, 17, 32–34] to de-
velop security mechanisms to protect users in the long run.
4. PASSWORD REUSE ACROSS SERVICES
We start by analyzing how often users reuse exactly the
same password for different services. Out of the 28.8 million
users in the primary dataset, we extract 37,301,406 password
pairs where both passwords are from the same user. If a
user has more than two passwords, then all possible pairs are
considered (e.g., 4 passwords means 6 pairs). We find that
34.3% of the pairs are identical pairs. At the user level, 38%
of the users (10.9 million) have at least one identical pair,
indicating that the user sets the same password for different
services. This ratio is slightly lower than the self-reported
result (51%) from a user study [8].
Next, we are curious whether users with more passwords
are more likely to reuse the same password. The intuition
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Figure 2: The workflow to measure a user’s password transformation patterns.
#PWs per User # of Users % of Users w/ PW Reuse
2 25,515,516 34.6%
3 2,877,322 63.4%
4 370,990 78.8%
5 54,258 74.6%
6 11,112 51.5%
7 3,701 29.6%
≥ 8 3,876 22.6%
Table 2: Password reuse rate vs. # of passwords per user.
is that it is difficult to memorize many completely different
passwords. Our result in Table 2 shows that this hypothe-
sis is true for users with less than 5 passwords. However,
the trend is reversed for users with even more passwords. A
careful examination shows that users with more passwords
are more likely to “modify” an existing password for new
services. Based on the results in §5, users with more than 4
passwords have a higher chance of modifying existing pass-
words (64.0%) compared with the overall ratio (21.0%).
As a case study, we specifically analyze the passwords for
“email” services. Email accounts are sensitive due to the fact
that emails can be used to reset the password for various on-
line services. Many online accounts will be in danger if the
user’s email account is compromised. As shown in Table 1,
we have 3 leaked email datasets from Gmail, Mail.ru
and Yandex. We identify 4,033,847 password pairs (in-
volving 3 million users) that contain an email password. We
find that 2,440,232 of the pairs are identical, which yields a
much higher reuse ratio (60.4%) than the overall ratio (34.3%).
This indicates users are more likely to use their email pass-
word for another service, a practice that incurs serious risks.
5. PASSWORD TRANSFORMATION
In addition to reusing the same password, users may also
modify an existing password when signing up for a new ser-
vice. Given a password pair of the same user, our goal is
to infer the “transformation rule” (it there is one) that the
user follows to modify the password. Then, we seek to un-
derstand how much the transformation patterns differ across
users from different demographics.
5.1 Transformation Rules
Our measurement workflow is shown in Figure 2. In to-
tal, we construct 8 rules for password transformation based
on our manual examinations of 1000 random password pairs
and results from prior studies [8, 38, 39]. We test these rules
against the password pairs in the primary dataset, and the
results are shown in Table 3.
Rule # Pairs of Passwords Ratio (%)
Ê. Identical 12,780,722 34.3%
Ë. Substring 3,748,258 10.0%
Ì. Capitalization 478,233 1.3%
Í. Leet 93,418 0.3%
Î. Reversal 5,938 < 0.1%
Ï. Sequential keys 12,118 < 0.1%
Ð. Common Substring 2,103,888 5.7%
½. Combination of Rules 754,393 2.0%
Can Not Find A Rule 17,324,438 46.4%
Total 37,301,406 100%
Table 3: Distribution of password transformation rules.
The majority of the password pairs (55.6%) can be ex-
plained by one of the transformation rules. To translate the
numbers to the user level, 38% of the users have reused the
same password at least once, and 21% of the users have once
modified an existing password to create a new one. Collec-
tively, these users count for 52%. The rest 48% of the users
are likely to create a new password from scratch for each
service. Below, we discuss each rule in details and further
analyze the unmatched passwords.
Identical. The most common rule is reusing the same
password (12 million password pairs, 34.3%).
Substring. This rule indicates that one password is a sub-
string of the other one (e.g., abc and abc12). This rule
matches 3.7 million password pairs (10%), indicating that
users have inserted/deleted a string to/from an existing pass-
word to make a new one. As shown in Table 4, most in-
sertions/deletions happened at the tail (87.2%). Most insert-
ed/deleted strings are pure digits (74%) and short (1–2 char-
acters), e.g., “1”, “2”, and “12”.
Capitalization. Users may simply capitalize certain letters
in a password. Even though the ratio of matched pairs is not
high (1.3%), the absolute number is still significant (478,233
pairs). We observe that users commonly capitalize letters in
the beginning of the password (73%), particularly the first
letter (68.6%).
Leet. 93,418 password pairs match the leet rule (0.3%) [3].
Leet transformation refers to replacing certain characters with
other similar-looking ones. Our analysis shows the top 10
most common transformations are: 0Öo, 1Öi, 3Öe, 4Öa,
1Ö!, 1Öl, 5Ös, @Öa, 9Ö6, and $Ös. These 10 trans-
formations already cover 96.6% of the leet pairs.
Reversal. Reversal rule is rarely used (5938 pairs,<0.1%),
which means reversing the order of the characters in a pass-
word, e.g., abcdÖdcba. Intuitively, reversed password is
hard to memorize.
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Figure 3: Distribution of password transformation rules for users of different professions and countries.
Insert/Delete Position Ratio Inserted/Deleted Length Ratio
Tail 87.2% 1 48.3%
Head 11.0% 2 28.0%
Both Ends 1.8% 3+ 23.7%
Insert/Delete Type Ratio Top Inserted/Deleted Str. Ratio
Digit 74.0% “1” 24.2%
Letter 17.8% “2” 4.0%
Combined 4.5 % “12” 2.1%
Special Char 3.7% “123” 1.9%
Table 4: Substring rule: insertion/deletion patterns.
Longest Comm. Substring Ratio Transformation Rules Ratio
Letter 63.8% Substitution 84.7%
Digit 22.0% Insertion/Deletion 32.4%
Combined 13.7% Capitalization 3.2%
Special Char 0.5% Switching Order 2.2%
Table 5: Common substring rule: longest common sub-
string and transformation patterns.
Sequential Keys. Sequential keys include alphabetically-
ordered letters (abcd), sequential numbers (1234) and ad-
jacent keys on the keyboard (qwert, asdfg, !@#$%). The
matched pairs (i.e., both passwords are sequential keys) are
also below 0.1%.
Common Substrings. When a user modifies an existing
password to create a new one, we assume the majority of the
password remains the same. As shown in Figure 2, we ex-
tract the longest common substrings from the two passwords
to learn how they transform the rest parts. To avoid acciden-
tal character overlaps, we require the longest common string
to be >2 characters, and all the common substrings should
cover >50% characters of a password (i.e., the majority).
This rule matches 2.1 million password pairs (5.7%). To
make sure the thresholds make sense, we manually examine
a random sample of 1000 matched pairs. 44 pairs look like
to have accidental overlaps, which projects a false positive
rate of 4.4%. We can tolerate false negatives for now since
we have one more rule left. Based on the false positive rate,
we estimate that the common substring rule should count for
at least 5.4% of all password pairs.
Table 5 shows that the longest common substrings are of-
ten pure letters (63.8%) or pure digits (22%). 56.7% of the
pure-letter strings are English words/names (based on NLTK
corpus [6]). Table 5 also shows the typical transformations.
Note that one password pair may have multiple transforma-
tions (total exceeds 100%).
Rule Combination Ratio Rule Combination Ratio
Capitalization+Substring 26.2% Reversal+CSS 6.1%
Leet+CSS 21.8% Leet+SubString 5.6%
Seqkey+CSS 13.2% Seqkey+SubString 4.2%
Reversal+Leet+CSS 7.1% Seqkey+Leet+CSS 2.9%
Capitalization+CSS 6.2% Others 6.8%
Table 6: Rule combinations (CSS: Common SubString).
Combination of Rules. As a final step, we combine pos-
sible rules to find a match. Note that rule3–6 modify the
characters (or the sequence) in a password, while rule2 and
rule7 operate on substrings. Our approach is to use a combi-
nation of rule3–6 to modify the password first, and then test
if rule2 or rule7 can declare a match. In this way, we further
matched another 754,000+ pairs (2.0%). Table 6 shows the
most common ways of combining rules.
Unmatched Password Pairs. After testing all the above
rules, there are 46.4% of password pairs remain unmatched.
To make sure we did not miss any major rules, we randomly
sample 1000 unmatched pairs for manual examination. We
did not find any password pair that still exhibited a meaning-
ful transformation. We regard the 46.4% of password pairs
as the result of users “making new passwords from scratch”.
5.2 Impact of User Demographics
Next, we seek to understand how much the transformation
patterns differ across different user demographics. We infer
user demographics from their email addresses.
Profession. Certain email domains are exclusive to peo-
ple of special organizations. For example, “.edu” is limited
to higher educational institutions, “.mil ” is exclusively to
military, and “.gov” represents government agencies. In to-
tal, we identify 128,036 users from educational institutions,
7,376 users from military, and 3,384 users from the govern-
ment. As shown in Figure 3(a), we find that their password
transformation patterns are surprisingly consistently: about
30% password pairs are identical, followed by those that ap-
ply the substring rule (about 10%), common substring rule
(about 5%) and capitalization rule (about 3%). Rules such as
leet, reversal and sequential key are consistently below 1%.
Country. Similar results are observed in Figure 3(b),
where we divide users based on their countries. More specif-
ically, we identify email domains that contain a country code
(e.g., “.ru” stands for Russia). This returns 233 country
codes and 5,892,528 users. In Figure 3(b), we plot the dis-
tributions of the transformation rules for the top 10 coun-
tries (counting for 90.5% of the users with a country code).
Again, the transformation patterns are very similar for users
from different countries.
Our result demonstrates a high-level of consistency (low
variance) for password transformation patterns across dif-
ferent user populations. This, however, could make the at-
tacker’s job easier. Even using a small dataset, it is possible
for the attacker to learn the basic transformation patterns that
apply to broader user populations. In the next section, we de-
velop a training-based algorithm to validate this hypothesis.
6. PASSWORD GUESSING
Based on the measurement results, we then evaluate the
security risks introduce by users modifying an existing pass-
word for different services. We perform password guess-
ing experiments using a training-based algorithm to answer
two key questions: First, how quickly can attackers guess a
modified password based on a known one? Second, given
the low variance of password transformation patterns, can
attackers use a small training data (e.g., 0.1%) to achieve ef-
fective guessing?
6.1 Guessing Algorithm
We build a new password guessing algorithm by address-
ing the weaknesses in DBCBW [8]. DBCBW is a popular
algorithm to guess a target user’s password by transforming
a known password of the same user. DBCBW’s design goal
is simplicity, but has two weaknesses: First, due to the lack
of training data, the algorithm uses hand-crafted transforma-
tion rules. Second, it applies these rules in a fixed order,
which may not be optimal for individual passwords. For ex-
ample, “l0ve” should try the leet rule first (0Õo), even
though the substring rule is overall more popular.
Our algorithm overcomes these drawbacks by introducing
a training phase. Using ground-truth password pairs as the
training data, we learn two things: (1) the transformation
procedure for each rule, and (2) a model to customize the
ordering of the rules for each password.
Training: Transformation Procedures. For each rule
Ri, we seek to learn a list of password transformations Ti =
[ti1, ti2, ...tiNi ] where tij represent one transformation un-
der this rule. Ti is sorted by the frequency of each transfor-
mation’s appearance in the training dataset. During pass-
word guessing, we will test each transformation indepen-
dently. For example, in the “substring rule”, t is charac-
terized by <insert/delete><position><string>. In “capital-
ization rule”, t is characterized by <position><#chars>. In
a similar way, we learn the transformation list T for “leet”,
“sequential keys” and “reversal”.
Common substring rule is special. During training, we
learn the sorted transformation list (insert, delete, replace,
substitute, switch orders). However, when applying the trans-
formation to a given password, we need to first split the pass-
18 Features Extracted from a Password
PW (password) length, # Lowercase letters, # Uppercase letters, # Digits,
# Special chars, Letter-only pw?, Digit-only pw?, # Repeated chars,
Max # consec. letters, Max # consec. digits, Max # sequential keys,
Englishword-only pw?, # Consec. digits (head), # Consec. digits (tail),
# Consec. letters (head), # Consec. letters (tail),
# Consec. special-chars (head), # Consec. special-chars (tail)
Table 7: Feature list of the Bayesian model.
word to detect potential common substrings. In our design,
we test 3 types of candidate: (1) substrings of pure dig-
its/letters/special characters, (2) English words/names, and
(3) popular common substrings in the training data. For
the “combined rule”, T is a sorted list of rule-combinations
where each rule-combination has a sorted list of transforma-
tions to be tested.
Training: Rule Ordering. For a given password, we
learn which rule should be applied first using a Bayesian
model. We treat this as a multiple-class classification prob-
lem. Given a password, we train a model to estimate the like-
lihood that the password can be transformed by each rule. To
achieve a quick training, we choose the Naive Bayes classi-
fier (multinomial model) [19], which produces the proba-
bility that a data point (password) belong to a class (rule).
Based on the probability, we customize the ordering of the
rules for this password. Table 7 shows the 18 features used
in the Bayesian model.
Password Guessing. For a given password pair (pw1, pw2),
we test how many attempts are needed to guess pw2 by trans-
forming a known pw1. We first use the Bayesian model to
generate a customized order of rules for pw1. Following the
ordered rule list, we have two options for guessing:
• Sequential: testing one rule at a time. After testing all the
transformations under a rule, we move to the next rule.
Since certain rules have a significantly longer list than
others, we set a threshold M as the maximum number of
guesses under each rule (M = 800 for our experiment).
• Rotational: testing one rule and one transformation at a
time. After testing one transformation under a rule, we
move to the next rule to test another transformation. We
rotate to test each rule for just one guess.
Sequential guessing requires a higher accuracy of the pre-
dicted order. If the predicted order is wrong, it will waste
many guesses on the wrong rule before moving on. Rota-
tional method is more tolerable to the prediction errors
Baselines. We use two baselines for comparison. First,
instead of customizing the order for each password, we ap-
ply the rules with a fixed order for “sequential guessing”
(similar to DBCBW). The fixed order is based on the overall
rule popularity in the training data. Our second baseline is
a popular off-the-shelf password cracking tool John the Rip-
per (JtR) [2]. We use the “single” mode of JtR and keep the
default setting. Given a password, JtR applies a list of man-
gling rules to transform the password. The guessing stops
when all the mangling rules are exhaustively tested.
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Figure 4: Password guessing with 50% of the data for training.
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6.2 Password Guessing Results
We use the proposed algorithm to evaluate the risks of
modified passwords. For this experiment, we exclude iden-
tical password pairs (34.3%) since they only take one guess,
and 46.4% of pairs that did not match a rule (i.e., new pass-
words created from scratch). This leaves us 7,196,242 pass-
word pairs that represent password modifications (exp dataset).
We conduct two experiments. First, we split the exp dataset
to use 50% for training and the other 50% for testing. Sec-
ond, to validate the “low-variance” assumption we try to use
much smaller training data.
Training on 50% of the Data. During password guessing,
we test both directions for each password pair (pw1Õpw2
and pw2Õpw1), which doubles the testing data. As shown in
Figure 4, our best algorithm guessed 46.5% of the passwords
within just 100 attempts. Figure 4(b) shows that 10 guesses
already cracked 30% of the passwords. In comparison, the
JtR baseline almost got nothing in the first 10 attempts and
exhausted all the mangling rules after 1081 guesses. Since
we evaluate an online-guessing scenario, we stopped our al-
gorithm after 5000 guesses for each password.2
Comparing different algorithms, we show that the Bayesian
model outperforms the fixed ordering method. This con-
firms the benefits to prioritize the more likely rules for each
password. In addition, rotational guessing is better than se-
quential guessing. Sequential guessing has a clear stair-step
increase of the hit rate after switching to a new rule. This in-
dicates that the first few transformations under each rule are
the most effective ones. Sequential guessing’s advantage is
in the first 5 guesses (Figure 4(b)) — if the Bayesian predic-
tion is correct, sticking to the right rule helped to guess the
password quicker. Rotational guessing has an overall better
performance by switching the rules more frequently.
Using Smaller Training Data. To validate the low-variance
assumption of the transformation patterns, we use even smaller
datasets to train our algorithm (Bayesian+rotational). We
vary the size of the training data from 0.01% to 10% of the
exp dataset. To be consistent, we use the same 50% as the
testing data (training and testing data has no overlap). As
shown in Figure 5, the 0.1%-training curve is still overlapped
with the 50%-curve, suggesting that extremely small train-
ing data can achieve a comparable performance. This con-
2Our experiment shows that 50,000 guesses can crack 70%.
firms the low-variance in password transformation patterns.
Intuitively, users modify a password for the ease of remem-
bering. This is likely to introduce easy-to-predict passwords.
To measure the number of vulnerable password pairs, we
use the 0.1%-trained model to guess the rest 99.9% of the
password pairs. Since we guess both directions, the test-
ing data essentially has 14 million passwords. Within 10 at-
tempts, we guessed 30% (4.2 million passwords) — 3.8 mil-
lion password pairs are cracked for at least one direction.
Together with the identical password pairs (12.8 million),
over 16.6 million pairs can be cracked within 10 attempts.
Cracking the Remaining Hashes. Finally, we perform
a quick experiment on the uncracked hashes in Section 3.
In total, we have 6,218,778 password pairs where one pass-
word is an uncracked hash, and the other one is in plain-
text. Our algorithm successfully recovered 939,400 (15.1%)
of the hashes within 5000 attempts, which demonstrates the
value of our algorithm over existing offline cracking tools.
As a future work, we plan to further test our algorithm on
salted password hashes.
7. DISCUSSION
After analyzing 28.8 million users’ passwords across 107
services, we find that a majority of users have reused the
same password or slightly modified an existing password for
different services. Password modification patterns are highly
consistent across various user populations, allowing attack-
ers to crack massive passwords online with minimal training.
Moving forward, the challenge is how to effectively mit-
igate the threat after a service is breached. Given the high
reuse rate of passwords, it is necessary to immediately notify
users to reset the password, not only for the breached service
but also other services with a similar password. The ques-
tion is who should play the role to notify users, given that
not all the breached services would immediately disclose
the incident or contact users [16, 27]. In addition, during
password reset, it is critical to make sure users don’t modify
the already-leaked password to create the new one. A better
practice is to use password managers (e.g., 1Password) to set
unique and complex passwords for each service without the
need to memorize them. Finally, our result shows a concern-
ing high ratio of email password reuse. We argue that more
specific warnings should be given to users to avoid reusing
the email password when signing up for a service.
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